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Too Dependent on Contractors? 
Minimum Standards for 
Responsible Governance
In the outsourcing debate, there are many benefits, challenges, and risks involved in privatization, but it is failed 
implementation, rather than outsourcing policy, that explains the government’s (mis)management of its contractors. 
This article addresses the issue of outsourcing and explores the minimum standards for responsible governance.
BY S T E VEN L .  SCHOONER AND DANIEL  S .  GREENSPAHN
Irresponsible Delegation and the 
Downward Spiral
Early in the twenty-first century, a longstanding, subtle trend 
toward outsourcing accelerated into a fundamental change in 
the nature of federal government. Federal procurement 
spending nearly doubled within six years,1 and with no 
reason to expect the hollow-government2 trend to reverse, the 
future seems bright for contractors. The public is slowly 
gaining awareness of this reality, albeit primarily through 
anecdotal and typically scandal-based information, but few 
appreciate that today the government likely employs more 
contractors than soldiers in Iraq;3 that high-profile mishaps 
are directly attributed to an unprecedented, poorly orches-
trated reliance on private security;4 and that during 2006, 
more than one in four allied fatalities consisted of contractor 
or civilian personnel.5
Closer to home, five years after the largest government 
reorganization in half a century, the heavily outsourced 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) remains the target 
of criticism due to its disproportionate reliance upon the 
private sector. DHS’s experience confirms the obvious 
proposition that outsourcing as a matter of necessity, rather 
than as a matter of policy, leads to suboptimal results, and it 
appears no relief is in sight. Tasked to protect against terrorist 
attacks and respond to natural disasters, the cobbled-together 
and heavily outsourced DHS instead often finds itself 
defending, well, itself, particularly against allegations of 
inadequate management and oversight of its contractors.6 
And while confronting these procurement challenges is 
important and indeed necessary, Congress routinely fails to 
recognize that throwing stones, while easier, is far less 
effective than developing solutions for solving difficult 
problems or building solid foundations.
Recommendations for meaningful, long-term procurement 
reform—whether for DHS or across the federal govern-
ment—must recognize the practical ramifications of 
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sustained, unplanned, and unchecked privatization in an era 
of downsized government. Despite a generation of bipartisan 
efforts to portray a “small government” to the public,7 
government mandates continue to increase, leaving agencies 
no choice but to increasingly rely upon contractors to provide 
mission-critical services. Simultaneously, however, Congress 
embarked upon an ill-conceived gutting of the acquisition 
workforce. This effort not only left the government woefully 
understaffed to manage its omnipresent cadre of service 
contractors, but also—through an absence of succession 
planning manifested by more than a decade of cuts and 
hiring freezes—ensured that fixing the damage could not 
feasibly be achieved in the foreseeable future. 
Too Dependent on Contractors?
Focusing on DHS as a proxy for the larger trend, it oversim-
plifies the outsourcing management problem to suggest that 
the agency is currently too dependent upon contractors. As a 
matter of policy, it is possible that, under different circum-
stances, an outsourced and privatized DHS may better serve 
the government’s interests.8 This potentially fascinating 
debate—over how much we should outsource—quickly 
polarizes participants into two basic camps. One camp 
staunchly advocates the rapidly changing status quo: that 
work historically or currently being performed by government 
employees should remain in-house.9 This position idolizes, or 
at the very least respects, both the ethos of public service and, 
more generally, public servants.10 The opposite camp advo-
cates outsourcing or reliance upon the private sector, asserting 
that for-profit firms are capable of performing much of the 
government’s work and, if properly motivated and managed, 
should outperform government employees in terms of quality 
of service, price of service, or both.11
However, at an abstract level, neither position is uniquely 
compelling.12 Empirical evidence is scant to demonstrate that 
government employees are more talented, committed, 
motivated, or honest than their private-sector counterparts 
(and vice-versa). But the two groups differ dramatically in 
their incentive structures. The private sector’s exposure to 
market forces, and the related corporate purpose of pursuing 
profit, permits (and arguably requires) a more diverse and 
potent arsenal of employee incentives and disincentives. These 
tools include compensation (e.g., attractive salaries, salary 
increases, bonuses, stock incentives, etc.), opportunity for 
advancement, and of course, the risk of termination.13 While 
the government can employ similar tools, their effect—or the 
degree to which these tools can influence behavior—is at least 
perceived as far less dramatic, given a heavily constrained 
promotion and bonus regime and an impenetrable de facto 
tenure system.14 Ultimately, the private sector enjoys the 
flexibility to offer far greater economic rewards for success 
and threaten more credible sanctions for less than desirable 
performance.15 While we continue to witness efforts to reform 
the civil service system and inject more potent performance 
incentives, doing so remains a daunting task.16
No Relief in Sight?
Ultimately, however, this debate is increasingly academic. 
Outsourcing is currently the inevitable reality.17 Today, the 
government relies on the private sector because it has 
restricted the size of government—more specifically, the 
number of government employees.18
Overseas, the government currently has no short-term 
option but to rely on contractors for every conceivable task 
that it lacks appropriate staff to fulfill. In Iraq, the military 
relies on contractor personnel not only for transportation, 
shelter, and food, but for unprecedented levels of battlefield 
and weaponry operation, support, and maintenance.19 
Accordingly, defense experts now recognize that without 
contractors, our military simply cannot project its technical 
superiority abroad.20 But highly publicized incidents—wheth-
er of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib or allegations of the 
shooting of civilians by the private military company 
Blackwater—raise fundamental questions regarding both the 
tasking of contractor personnel and the oversight of their 
performance.21
At home, DHS also has no meaningful short-term 
alternatives for escaping its current predicament. It would 
take many years to build DHS into a significantly larger, 
cohesive organization,22 and it is unlikely that there is enough 
political will on either side of the aisle to grow the federal 
workforce.23 Further, it is distinctly possible, given the 
constraints of the federal service (particularly in terms of 
compensation), that even if Congress mandated a dramatic 
expansion, DHS simply could not assemble a sufficiently 
talented organization.24 For example, the market for talent is 
now global, and the global shortage of engineers is well 
documented.25 Thus, it is not an option for DHS to consoli-
date its missions, jettison a number of its tasks, terminate 
contracts, or to take on only those missions it is appropriately 
staffed to perform.26 Nor is it feasible for DHS to wait while it 
embarks upon an aggressive program to identify, recruit, hire, 
and retain an extraordinary number of civil servants. Accord-
ingly, DHS must continue to employ its best efforts to 
achieve its mission with the resources available, acknowledge 
that it is a rather “hollow” agency,27 and invest significant 
energy and resources in improving its use of contractors to 
help it achieve its mission.28
Journal of Contract Management / Summer 2008    11
Too dependenT on conTracTors? mInImum sTandards for responsIble governance
An Ounce of Prevention…
Accordingly, today the government needs to invest significant 
resources—time, money, and energy—to recruit, train, 
incentivize, and retain a dramatically expanded acquisition 
workforce.29 Not only must the government promptly and 
aggressively recruit a huge number of business-minded 
professionals, but also must train the new personnel and 
provide supplemental training to the existing workforce to 
enhance their competence and expertise. Further, the govern-
ment needs to provide meaningful incentives for, and employ 
creative solutions to retain (or of course, to continually recruit 
and train) over time, the best, most experienced professionals. 
Unfortunately, few satisfactory short-term solutions exist to 
solve the current acquisition workforce crisis.30 A personnel 
crisis methodically orchestrated over more than a 15-year 
period cannot be ameliorated overnight. Even if for the 
foreseeable future the government hired every qualified 
acquisition professional willing to work for the government, it 
would still likely prove insufficient to meet the government’s 
needs. (And that is without taking into account the well-
chronicled upcoming exodus of retirement-eligible acquisition 
personnel.)31 Moreover, there is every reason to be pessimistic 
about the government’s ability to promptly and effectively 
train such an influx of professionals. Similarly, current 
demographic information suggests that younger, entry-level 
workers are far more mobile than their predecessors, which 
may make retention of this new talent difficult.
However, the specifics—such as how many thousands more 
acquisition professionals (5,000; 10,000; or more) must be 
hired,32 how the procurement community should receive mean-
ingful hands-on training, and how these professionals should 
be incentivized—are far less important than the threshold issue 
or predicate. Congress must invest heavily and aggressively in 
rebuilding the acquisition workforce. Significant improvement 
depends upon a clear message from Congress accompanied by 
sustained, dramatic increases in appropriations specifically for 
acquisition personnel.33 Flexible recruitment and hiring 
authority, as well as increased flexibility with regard to 
compensation and incentives, may prove necessary. Absent 
such a commitment, which would be as welcome as it would be 
unexpected, any attempted solution will serve as little more 
than a finger in the dike.
The Expanding Scope of Outsourcing: 
Contract Proliferation and Increased 
Reliance on Service Contractors
Government use of, and reliance upon, private contractors is 
not a new phenomenon,34 nor are debates over the relative 
benefits and risks of outsourcing government work. In the 
1960s, President Eisenhower warned against the unwar-
ranted influence of military contractors,35 and a report to 
President Kennedy expressed similar concerns about the 
blurring lines between public and private decision-making.36 
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Yet, in recent years, Democratic and Republican administra-
tions and congressional leaders alike have all embraced a 
downsized federal government supported by private 
contractors.37 This has led to unprecedented privatization in 
both breadth and scope.
Today, for the first time in modern U.S. history, the federal 
government spends nearly 50 cents of every discretionary 
dollar of the federal budget on contracts with private firms.38 
Procurement spending has nearly doubled from $219 billion 
in 2000 to more than $415 billion in 2006,39 and continues 
to rise, while the rest of the discretionary budget has in-
creased only 6.7 percent per year.40 At the Department of 
Defense (DOD), federal contract spending more than 
doubled from $133 billion in 2000 to over $297 billion in 
2006, accounting for 72 percent of the federal procurement 
budget.41 Also, DHS spending on contracts soared 337 
percent in four years and rose from $5 billion in 2003 to $15 
billion in 2006.42
The rapid post-millennium growth in federal government 
contracting43—the lion’s share of which is services contract-
ing—has dramatically outpaced (indeed, each year, more 
than doubled) the rate of inflation. As FIGuRE 1 demonstrates, 
the rate of growth in federal procurement spending has 
exceeded the increases in the consumer price index (CPI) 
every year this decade. But even that understates the enormity 
of the growth. Overall, as indicated in FIGuRE 2, from 2000 
through the end of 2006, the CPI rose only 17.1 percent, 
while federal procurement spending rose by 89.2 percent. In 
other words, in this decade, federal procurement spending 
increased at a rate five times the rate of inflation. During that 
time frame, the federal workforce remained largely stable, but 
significantly smaller than in earlier years.44
In addition to hiring more contractor personnel, the 
government today relies upon contractors for increasingly 
critical and sensitive defense-related tasks, and turns more 
and more to contractors for healthcare, education, welfare, 
and prison management.45 In the wakes of the September 11, 
2001 tragedy and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the govern-
ment contracted out public service obligations such as disaster 
relief, border security, port security, and policing,46 but no 
outsourcing undertaking has proven more controversial than 
the use of contractors in military and foreign operations.47
In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors provide support 
services such as food, housing, and sanitation for U.S. troops, 
but also gather intelligence, maintain weapons, train troops, 
and handle interrogations.48 The private military industry has 
mushroomed49 with a disconcerting number of private 
contractors on the ground in Iraq, many of whom bear 
arms.50 In describing the modern era “soldiers for hire” 
phenomenon, Peter Singer, author of Corporate Warriors: The 
Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, explained that “the 
wholesale outsourcing of U.S. military services since the 
1990s is unprecedented.”51
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Why Outsourcing Makes Sense
While these facts and statistics may suggest otherwise, none 
of this should be read as a conceptual or ideological opposi-
tion to outsourcing. Outsourcing permits organizations to 
focus on what they do best (which hopefully coincides with 
the organizations’ missions or mandates), while relying upon 
other more efficient entities to provide the goods, services, 
and support necessary to do so. Moreover, the government 
has historically sought experience, innovation, and capacity 
from the private sector. That makes sense. Experience 
suggests that privatization offers many potential benefits, 
including surge capacity, flexibility, innovation, and quite 
often, the ability to meet agency missions using limited 
government personnel, abilities, and resources. Despite a 
relentless deluge of negative publicity and, unfortunately, a 
number of contractor missteps, many of these benefits—
particularly in terms of speed, quality of service, and custom-
er satisfaction—have been demonstrated by the U.S. Army’s 
global use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP).52 Another instructive, but oft-criticized, anec-
dote can be found in the government’s increased use of 
large-scale “seat management” contracts to outsource agencies’ 
information technology functions to the private sector.53
Using outside contractors for surge capacity offers the 
government the ability to supplement limited governmental 
resources far more quickly, efficiently, and effectively than the 
existing federal personnel or acquisition regimes permit.54 The 
federal government can tap contractor personnel when war, 
storms, or earthquakes occur, without keeping excess (and 
thus idle) personnel on the payroll during times of calm or, 
much later, funding their retirement and subsidizing their 
healthcare.55 Contractors also enjoy more flexibility in setting 
compensation and benefits and in hiring and firing, making 
them better situated than the government to react to fluctuat-
ing markets to meet short-term demands for workers.56 
Whether in Baghdad or New Orleans, private contractors 
have the potential to offer superior speed and geographic 
flexibility in terms of deploying expertise.57
Privatization also offers flexibility in employing superior 
technology, better talent, and different approaches than the 
government’s existing workforce and capital resources would 
permit.58 In an era of downsized government,59 private 
contractors provide specifically what the government lacks, 
such as the skill, expertise, and innovation necessary to carry 
out government functions.60 Thus, contractors are a critical 
resource for agencies struggling to fulfill their missions, 
particularly where the federal government has limited staffing, 
resources, or skills. For agencies operating under tight 
personnel ceilings that restrict staffing, contractors have 
significantly helped to execute government functions.61 By 
taking over ancillary responsibilities, contractors also enable 
agency staff to focus on core responsibilities,62 which in the 
defense context, is typically described as increasing the 
military services’ “tooth to tail” ratio.63
Although cost savings are sometimes deemed a benefit of 
privatization, some critics question whether contractors are 
more cost-effective.64 In any event, the potential for cost 
savings alone should not be deemed a primary benefit for 
reliance upon contractors, and slavish focus upon the relative 
cost of contractor support is misguided. Moreover, it is not 
productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors “too 
much” without: 
Permitting, as an alternative, an agency to hire •	
additional personnel; 
Confirming that sufficient personnel are available •	
in the marketplace and willing to work for the 
government; 
Comparing “apples to apples,” such as taking into •	
account all of the long-term or legacy costs of civil 
servants or members of the armed services; and 
Considering critical issues such as flexibility and •	
surge capacity.65
For example, higher contractor salaries may be offset, at 
least in part, by long-run costs avoided. Indeed, a strong case 
could be made that for short-term demands for additional 
resources it makes sense to pay higher, and potentially 
significantly higher, amounts for contractor support rather 
than incurring the legacy cost of additional government 
employees. 
Challenges of Outsourced Government
There are, of course, competing challenges associated with 
any organization relying extensively on contractors or other 
external resources. In addition to maintaining a cohesive 
culture and instilling shared values, the central difficulties 
lie in planning, negotiating, managing, and overseeing 
effective contracts and most importantly, maintaining a 
sufficiently educated, experienced, and motivated govern-
ment (or augmented) workforce to take on these challenges.
Adequate government planning is necessary to both 
understand and describe the outcomes and tasks that will be 
sought from the private sector. As today’s procurement 
officials are often overworked and undersupported, planning 
is extremely limited or simply delegated to contractors.66 
Accordingly, critics lament that statements of work routinely 
lack measurable outcomes, and that contractors prepare 
budgets, manage employee relations in a blended workforce, 
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and develop regulations.67 Privatization also requires selecting 
appropriate, qualified contractors in a timely fashion, negoti-
ating cost-effective agreements, and drafting clear contracts 
that contain effective incentives or profit mechanisms to 
maximize contractor performance. The inability to satisfacto-
rily perform any of these functions alters the nature of the 
government’s delegation. For example, like other agencies, 
DHS risks becoming “so dependent on contractors that it 
simply has no in-house ability to evaluate the solutions its 
contractors propose or to develop options on its own ac-
cord.”68 Lastly, privatization requires that the government 
manage its contractual relationships and provide appropriate 
oversight to ensure it receives value for its money and avoids 
corruption. At best, poorly managed outsourcing reduces the 
likelihood that the government will get value for the taxpay-
ers’ money; at worst, it renders the public’s expenditures 
susceptible to inefficiency and waste.69
DHS continues to experience the challenges of privati-
zation and is persistently criticized for its ineffective 
contract management and oversight.70 The DHS inspector 
general (IG), for example, has identified plentiful examples 
of poorly defined contractual requirements, inadequate 
oversight, unsatisfactory results, and unnecessary costs.71 
In part, the problem stems from DHS never having 
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the proper 
balance between its employees and contractors.72 Instead, 
DHS, like other federal agencies, simply hired contractors 
to supervise other contractors. For example, DHS esti-
mates that 60 percent of the 270 personnel it will use to 
oversee the massive SBInet border security contract will be 
contractors.73 Also, DHS has vested a great deal of 
decision-making authority in its contractors, such as in the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s “Deepwater” initiative, in ways that 
critics perceive as impeding agency authority over the 
design and production of its own assets.74
Of course, DHS is not alone in drawing criticism for 
ineffective oversight,75 lacking the resources and author-
ity to ensure adequate contract oversight,76 or relying on 
outside help to prepare budgets, develop policy, and 
coordinate intelligence (which puts the agency at risk of 
being unduly influenced by contractors).77 Even a former 
DHS chief procurement officer (CPO) recognized the 
fact that the blurred lines between government and 
contractor employees in a blended workforce raises 
concerns about organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) 
and contractor ethics.78 In short, according to the CPO, 
there are “too many contractors performing too many 
functions with too little supervision.”79
Risks of Poorly Orchestrated 
Outsourcing 
Against this backdrop, the risks of relying so heavily upon 
contractors are constrained only by one’s imagination. These 
risks include, but are by no means limited to: 
Interference with an agency’s ability to •	
accomplish its mission; 
Harm being inflicted upon the public, the •	
government, and others; 
Loss of public confidence in the government; •	
and, of course,
Excessive expenditure of public funds.•	 80
To exacerbate these risks, in an uncertain legal regime, 
there is a heightened risk that contractors cannot be held 
accountable and thus will escape liability for corruption 
or criminal acts.81
There is no shortage of examples to demonstrate the 
risks of privatization. Isolated examples, such as scandals 
at Abu Ghraib or improper accounting and billing 
practices by KBR/Halliburton, gave way to a host of 
evolving foibles in Iraq.82 At home, in March 2008, 
privacy abuses involving all three of the major 2008 
presidential candidates83 and in antiterrorist data mining 
illustrates the problems of employing private contractors in 
response to the 9/11 attacks.84 The poorly orchestrated and 
seemingly uncoordinated response to Hurricane Katrina 
and plans to give contractors virtual autonomy in handling 
captured illegal immigrants at the United States/Mexico 
border demonstrate that significant outsourcing risks will 
continue to haunt DHS for some time.85
Although there is always room for minimizing these 
risks, the current laws and regulations governing today’s 
acquisition environment are, for the most part, ad-
equate.86 Rather, the lion’s share of DHS’ and the 
government’s contracting difficulties can be traced to the 
implementation of those laws, regulations, and policies. 
And implementation is more about people than policy. 
The root cause of the problems is derived from resource 
deficiencies and more specifically, an inadequate acquisi-
tion workforce.
Inadequate Investment in Acquisition 
Resources is Irresponsible Given the 
Government’s Unavoidable Reliance 
upon Contractors
Unfortunately, acknowledgment of the acquisition workforce 
crisis has been slow in coming and at times impeded by 
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denial.87 Today, as the topic gains traction, it is easy to agree 
with Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommen-
dations for reform at DHS.88 It is difficult to conceive of a 
higher priority for a heavily outsourced agency, such as DHS, 
than to “assess program office staff and expertise necessary to 
provide sufficient oversight” of its most important service 
contracts.89 GAO is correct to prod DHS to assess the risks of 
relying so heavily upon contractors as part of the acquisition 
process. While DHS may have no choice but to rely upon 
contractors despite those risks, the discipline may result in 
contracts that more carefully attempt to control those risks. 
Further, DHS should “define contract requirements to clearly 
describe roles, responsibilities, and limitations” as part of the 
acquisition planning process.90 Additional effort devoted to 
acquisition planning will pay dividends during contract 
performance.91
The Need for Acquisition Workforce 
Investments
Again, DHS is not alone. The federal government must 
devote more resources to the acquisition function. This invest-
ment is urgent following the bipartisan congressionally 
mandated acquisition workforce reductions that spanned the 
1990s.92 Although no empirical evidence supported the policy, 
the sustained reductions and subsequent failure to replenish 
the workforce created a generational void and devastated 
procurement personnel morale.93 By some measures, as FIGuRE 
3 illustrates, DOD’s acquisition workforce of over 500,000 in 
1990 was slashed to 300,000 in 1996 and to 200,000 in 2004, 
at the very same time that its procurement budget doubled 
from $145 billion in 1990 to over $380 billion in 2006.94 
Simultaneously, the government skimped on training, as 
contracting officers faced increasing workloads and confront-
ed dramatically changing and increasingly complex contrac-
tual challenges.95 Despite the explosive growth in the reliance 
upon service contracts,96 no emphasis was placed upon 
obtaining or retaining skilled professionals to plan for, 
compete, award, or manage sophisticated long-term service 
contracts.97 As a result, “the shift from the acquisition of 
goods to...services, combined with the heavy reliance on 
interagency contracting, has resulted in ‘markedly greater 
demands on the Acquisition Workforce for capability, 
training, time, and sophistication.’”98
The macro (governmentwide) and micro (acquisition 
workforce) effects of the 1990s downsizing frenzy left the 
federal government woefully unprepared to identify, recruit, 
manage, and incentivize the (hypothetically revolutionized) 
acquisition workforce envisioned by the 1990s reforms.99 The 
dramatic increase in procurement spending since the 9/11 
attacks exacerbated the simmering workforce crisis.100 
Congressional investment in the people who are responsible 
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for that procurement has not kept pace, even as Congress 
began to recognize that agencies “currently lack the means to 
provide proper oversight of...service contracts, in part because 
of an insufficient number of contract oversight personnel.”101 
Quite simply, today the government lacks sufficient qualified 
acquisition, contract management, and quality control 
personnel to handle the growth in service contracts,102 and 
the existing personnel lack the qualifications and experience 
necessary for them to perform a complicated, highly discre-
tionary task over extended periods of time.103
Unfortunately, as our procurement system has struggled 
throughout this decade, more energy has been devoted to 
punishment rather than cure. Specifically, Congress has been 
quick to call for more auditors and IGs to scrutinize contract-
ing and increase accountability.104 While this is a responsible 
gesture, the corresponding call for more contracting experts 
and staff to perform the many functions that are necessary for 
the procurement system to work well has been both delayed 
and, sadly, muted.105 In order to serve the taxpaying public 
and to meet the needs of agency customers, acquisition 
professionals must: 
Promptly and accurately describe what the •	
government needs to buy, 
Assess the marketplace to identify and select quality •	
suppliers, 
Strike deals that ensure fair prices, •	
Structure contracts with proper monetary incen-•	
tives for good performance, and 
Effectively manage and evaluate contractor •	
performance.106
Accordingly, the contracting workforce—understaffed, 
under-resourced, and underappreciated—desperately requires 
a dramatic recapitalization.107 But acquiring the necessary 
talent to do so will not be easy. Senior government officials 
increasingly bemoan that no young person in his or her right 
mind would enter government contracting as a career.108 And 
it is possible that even an extremely aggressive recruiting 
campaign may do no more than keep pace with the pending 
exodus of retirement-eligible acquisition professionals that 
constitute the current workforce’s critical mass.109
Personal Services Contracting as a 
Symptom of the Acquisition Crisis
Turning from the macro to the micro, one of the most 
intriguing aspects of necessity-driven outsourcing has been 
the erosion of the government’s longstanding prohibitions 
against personal services contracting. This little-understood 
nuance is critical to understanding the significance of the 
outsourcing trends and the scope of the delegation of 
government duties and responsibilities implicated by that 
outsourcing. Use of personal service contracts—
“characterized by the employer–employee relationship [they] 
create between the government and the contractor’s 
personnel”—empowers contractor personnel to make 
discretionary decisions historically (and, arguably, legally) 
required to be made by government officials.110
In a classic (nonpersonal) services contract, the government 
delegates a function to a contractor. Conversely, in personal 
services contracts, the government retains the function, but 
contractor personnel staff the effort. Despite longstanding 
legal and policy objections to the use of personal services 
contracts,111 we have witnessed an explosive growth in what 
are referred to as “body shop” or “employee augmentation” ar-
rangements, through which the government, as a matter of 
practice and necessity, hires contractor personnel to replace, 
supplement, or work alongside civil servants or members of 
the armed forces.112 This is the antithesis of the government’s 
preferred approach, known as “performance-based service 
contracting.”113 Civil servants work alongside, with, and at 
times, for contractor employees who sit in seats previously 
occupied by government employees.114 Unfortunately, no one 
stopped to train the government workforce on how to operate 
in such an environment, referred to as a “blended work-
force.”115 The worst-case scenarios have arisen where contrac-
tors perform work under open-ended contracts without 
guidance or management from a responsible government 
official, and typically facilitated by the reliance on interagency 
contracting vehicles. Increasing attention to this oversight 
vacuum has begun to reign in this practice,116 but the practice, 
with its attendant delegation of authority from government 
officials to contractor personnel, persists.
Across the government, the longstanding prohibitions 
against personal services contracting have become dead letter.117 
With the prohibition’s erosion, the scope of the government’s 
delegation to its contractors expands. In less than a decade, 
services contracts grew 72 percent at DOD from $82 billion in 
1996 to $141 billion in 2005.118 DHS already enjoys greater 
authority to employ personal services contracting authority 
through the Homeland Security Act.119 In addition to potential 
OCIs,120 this trend raises a number of issues regarding the man-
agement of human capital.121 In attempting to attract and 
retain a qualified workforce, DHS may find it increasingly 
difficult to articulate why individuals should come to work for 
or stay employed by DHS rather than its contractors.122 This 
problem is particularly acute where contractors employ 
incentives such as compensation, training, and travel to reward 
and retain their top talent. 
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Conclusion: A Call to Action
In the end, the federal government’s inadequate and often 
failed implementation of its outsourcing efforts renders it 
difficult, if not impossible, to draw broad conclusions on the 
validity of outsourcing as a matter of public policy. The 
primary lessons learned from the past 20 years merely reflect 
the fundamental assumptions commonly accepted by 
competent procurement professionals. First, if a procuring 
entity fails to invest time and energy in understanding its 
requirements and, equally important, articulating its desired 
outcomes (or frankly, what value it expects to receive in 
return for its money) to its private-sector business partner, it is 
unlikely that the government’s end user will be satisfied with 
the result. More specifically, failure to plan typically guaran-
tees a suboptimal result. Finally, outsourcing—particularly of 
mission-critical, complex tasks—requires a large, experienced, 
and properly incentivized cadre of skilled professionals to: 
Plan; •	
Identify requirements; •	
Conduct market research; •	
Draft specifications and solicitations; •	
Manage competitions; •	
Draft, negotiate, and award contracts; and •	
Manage contractor performance by providing: •	
Advice and guidance, –
Quality assurance,  –
Compliance through appropriate oversight,  –
Facilitation of invoicing and payment,  –
The proper handling of contingencies (and  –
related modifications and terminations), 
The closing out of contractual relationships,  –
and 
Generally ensuring appropriate stewardship  –
of the public’s scarce resources. 
Unfortunately, more than 15 years of ill-conceived and 
inadequate investment in the federal government’s acquisition 
workforce, followed by a governmentwide failure to respond to 
a dramatic increase in procurement activity, has led to a buying 
and contract management regime animated by triage, with 
insufficient resources available for contract administration, 
management, and oversight.123 The old adage “an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure” rings true. More auditors 
and IGs, in performing their critical functions, will guarantee a 
steady stream of scandals. But they will neither help avoid the 
scandals nor improve the procurement system. Conversely, a 
prospective investment in upgrading the number, skills, 
incentives, and morale of government purchasing officials 
would reap huge long-term dividends for the taxpayers. 
Despite all of the credit it deserves for adding the acquisi-
tion workforce to its mandate, in the end, the Acquisition 
Advisory Panel (AAP) failed to demand sufficiently forceful 
action on this critical issue. The AAP concluded that it lacked 
sufficient, credible information on the size, composition, or 
strength of the current acquisition workforce to make 
meaningful recommendations as to the target size of the 
acquisition workforce. Fortunately, the Gansler Commission 
did not similarly shy away from the core problem, instead 
sounding a clarion call for restoration and reinvigoration of 
the acquisition workforce: “The Commission believes that the 
Army contracting community has reached a ‘tipping point’ 
that requires extraordinary action.”124 Moreover, the report 
presciently articulates: “Too often it takes a crisis to bring 
about major change—the Iraq/Kuwait/Afghanistan contract-
ing problems have created a crisis!”125
While DHS’s experience may be unique due to its 
lightning-rod, magnetic attraction of criticism, and the army’s 
courage in its self-assessment is commendable, neither the 
army nor DHS is alone in facing this crisis. Rather, this 
problem—pervasive reliance upon contractors without 
sufficient qualified personnel to properly manage contractual 
relationships—bedevils the entire federal government. 
At the same time, this problem requires strong leadership 
and the upcoming presidential election poses another 
daunting challenge. The public neither comprehends nor 
favors outsourcing as a matter of policy. Moreover, the 
acquisition community, the nuances of the procurement 
regime, and the demands inherent in purchasing more than 
$400 billion annually of services, supplies, and construction, 
are invisible to the public. Similarly, the public has no grasp 
on the direct relationship between outsourcing and the need 
to invest heavily in the acquisition workforce. Accordingly, 
none of the presidential candidates—Democrat, Republican, 
or (when still in the race) Independent—believed their 
campaigns would benefit from suggesting that good govern-
ment (or for that matter, competent government) demands a 
massive infusion of resources to restore and reinvigorate the 
acquisition workforce,126 nor should we expect a leadership 
epiphany after the 2008 election.
Although a small number of influential members of 
Congress—Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Joseph 
Lieberman (I-CT), and Representative Henry Waxman 
(D-CA), to name a few—have begun to recognize the need, 
they lack the power to generate the sufficient investment 
required to recapitalize the acquisition workforce. But at least 
the process has begun, however tentatively. Accordingly, the 
acquisition community and those directly affected by it must 
engage in an unprecedented effort to educate our elected 
representatives not only of the need for resources, but also in 
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the dividends to be reaped by investment in the acquisition 
community. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(OFPP) must aggressively take up the leadership role assigned 
by S. 680.127 At a minimum, OFPP must become the 
acquisition workforce’s primary advocate and cheerleader; a 
role from which it too often has shied away. Similarly, NCMA 
is well positioned to lead such an initiative, but it cannot 
succeed alone. Unlimited potential allies exist; they need only 
be harnessed. 
Together, the combined voices of those that favor good 
government, fiscal responsibility, and good business can 
articulate the government’s need for a well-staffed, experi-
enced, and well-trained acquisition workforce. The case is 
clear and the need is great. The time for action is now. JCM
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and development. During that time, the private sector 
dramatically outpaced the government in the creation of new 
technology, both in terms of hardware solutions and business 
systems and processes. As a result, not surprisingly, the 
most talented workforce follows the technology, a trend 
that increasingly makes government work less attractive. 
Moreover, the combination of government recruiting 
policies, salaries, benefits, opportunities, and quality of 
work lag behind much of the private sector, particularly 
in high-demand career fields. Thus, the market reflects 
that the government undervalues critical skills. See GAO-
07-45SP, “Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisition 
Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century,” 13-15, 
October 2006, available at www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0745sp.pdf; and GAO-08-93SP, “A Call for Stewardship: 
Enhancing the Federal Government’s Ability to Address Key 
Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges,” 19-21, October 
2007, available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0893sp.pdf. 
See Verkuil, note 8, at 149-50, 159-62, and 173-74.59. 
See CBO, 60. Logistics Support, supra note 11, at 
23-25; and Duke Testimony, supra note 26, at 7.
See, generally, Verkuil, Paul R., “Public Law Limitations 61. 
on Privatization of Government Functions,” 84, National 
Contract Law Review, 397, 399-402 (2006).
Statement of Senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME), U.S. Senate 62. 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Hearing, “Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the 
Government’s Work?” (October 17, 2007). See also CBO, 
Logistics Support, supra note 11, at ix-xi, 23-25 (describing 
the use of private contractors for logistics support in 
construction, food, fuel, housing, and supplies to ensure the 
military can focus on its mission of combat operations). 
See Gansler Commission, 63. supra note 24: “In the decade 
and a half since the Cold War terminated, the Department 
of Defense...made significant changes to adapt to meet the 
expected challenges....The Army has transitioned many jobs 
that were previously performed by individuals in uniform 
during the Cold War to performance by contractors.” (Ibid. 
at 13.) Unfortunately, altering the ratio is not without costs. 
The Gansler Commission found “that the Institutional Army 
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policy to extensively outsource support services (in the 
case of Iraq and Afghanistan, over 160,000 contractors—
over 50 percent of the total force). Since these services 
are needed, and are now being provided by commercial 
vendors instead of organically, they can only be fulfilled 
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personnel who are specialists in contracting. If the military 
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professionals who can acquire the support services his 
unit needs, then he has lost capability.” (Ibid. at 13.)
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the cost of this procurement oversight gap may be as 
high as $1.1 trillion. See also U.S. House Government 
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“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” Iraq 
Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital 
Management, January 2006 (concluding that “large-scale 
reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq could not be 
solved by contracting out these duties”), available at www.
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work without meaningful methods for ensuring contractual 
compliance); Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector 
General, Coalition Provisional Authority’s Contracting Processes 
Leading Up to and Including Contract Award, OIG-CPA-04-013, 
July 27, 2004; and GAO-04-854, “Military Operations: DOD’s 
Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires 
Strengthened Oversight,” July 19, 2004 (concluding that 
there is a lack of appropriately trained military staff to 
provide effective oversight and that many military units lack 
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work), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04854.pdf.
GAO-07-900, “Department of Homeland Security: 76. 
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Department’s Acquisition Oversight Plan,” June 13, 2007, 
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07900.pdf. 
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available at www.fcw.com/online.news/150552-1.html.
Duke Testimony, note 26, at 8.78. 
Pierce, see note 22, at 4-5.79. 
GAO artfully states that increasing reliance upon 80. 
contractor services runs the risk that the “government 
[loses] control over and accountability for mission-related 
policy and program decisions.” GAO, “DHS: Improved 
Assessment and Oversight Needed,” note 6, at 2. 
See, e.g., Dickinson, “Public Law Values,” 81. supra note 
12, at 384, 397-400 (explaining the gaps in holding 
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the state action doctrine have been largely unwilling to 
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Heather Carney, Note, “Prosecuting the Lawless: Human 
Rights Abuses and Private Military Firms,” 74, George 
Washington Law Review 317, 330-36, 2006 (suggesting 
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lack of clarity in the liability regime regarding civilian 
contractors). For more background on the jurisdictional 
patchwork under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act (MEJA), the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
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see Verkuil, supra note 8, at 38 and Workshop Summary, 
“Princeton Problem-Solving Workshop Series in Law and 
Security: A New Legal Framework for Military Contractors?” 
(June 8, 2007), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/
conferences/military07/MilCon_Workshop_Summary.pdf.
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 82. 
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and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas, SIGIR 
07-012T at 2-3 (June 19, 2007), available at www.sigir.mil/
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Minow, note 9, at 989-94.84. 
Verkuil, note 8, at 30-37.85. 
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frankly, disturbingly chaotic reliance upon private security. 
As recent events make clear, the risks in this area are 
particularly grave, the existing legal and regulatory regimes 
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manner. The events involving Blackwater on September 
16, 2007, appear to have become the proverbial straw 
that broke the camel’s back. Peter Singer’s popular book, 
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 
was published in 2003; the popular frontline documentary 
“Private Warriors,” aired in 2005, (viewable at www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors); and the National 
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(ICAF) has conducted two lengthy studies on privatized 
military operations in 2006, www.ndu.edu/ICAF/Industry/
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David Safavian, while still serving as the OFPP administrator, 87. 
unhesitatingly proclaimed: “OMB does not support an 
increase in billets merely to establish an arbitrary level for 
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later’ solution has been replaced with a disciplined, outcome-
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meet their human resources and program needs in a more 
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the challenge.” Honorable David H. Safavian, “Delivering 
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Contractor, June 15, 2005. Safavian was responding to 
one of the author’s assertions that “the [OFPP] policy 
letter ignores the proverbial elephant in the room: the 
[g]overnment lacks the number of strong, talented, and well 
trained procurement horses needed to pull the wagon....
[And] despite a clear need for additional resources, 
Safavian, like many of his predecessors at OFPP, steadfastly 
refuses to call for increasing the size of the acquisition 
workforce.” Steven L. Schooner, “Empty Promise,” note 29.
See GAO, 88. DHS: Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed, 
note 6, at 25. 
Ibid.89. 
Ibid.90. 
Ibid. Unfortunately, haste and lack of resources 91. 
frequently continue to lead to inadequate acquisition 
planning. Absent strong leadership, calling for “strategic-
level guidance for determining the appropriate mix of 
government and contractor employees” may result in 
empty rhetoric. Ultimately, it is unlikely that DHS will 
be able to meaningfully implement these actions. 
See, e.g., Gansler Commission, 92. supra note 24, at 90-104 
(noting an overworked, understaffed, undertrained, 
undersupported, and undervalued acquisition workforce).
See, e.g., Professional Services Council (PSC) and 93. 
Grant Thornton, PSC Procurement Policy Survey: 
Troubling Trends In Federal Procurement, 2006 (noting 
that the acquisition workforce is the top concern for 
federal managers), available at www.pscouncil.org/
pdfs/2006PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.pdf.
See, e.g., Gansler Commission, 94. supra note 24, at 91. 
See, generally, Acquisition Advisory Panel, 95. Report of 
the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress, 
January 2007, available at www.acqnet.gov/comp/aap/
finalaapreport.html. AAP performed a valuable public 
service by discussing the acquisition workforce in its report 
and raised the profile of this critical issue. Although this 
issue originally fell outside of its legislative mandate, AAP 
persuasively argued that acquisition workforce problems 
permeate most, if not all, of the issues before AAP. AAP did 
more than any group to date in attempting to catalog the 
scope of the problem. Among other important observations, 
AAP aptly chronicled that: (1) agencies have failed to 
perform systematic human capital planning to assess 
their acquisition workforce, either in the present or with 
an eye toward the future; (2) despite the myriad methods 
in which the acquisition workforce has been defined and 
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currently play an important role in assisting, supporting, 
and, yes, augmenting the acquisition workforce; and 
(3) “While the private sector invests substantially in a 
corps of highly sophisticated, credentialed, and trained 
business managers to accomplish sourcing, procurement, 
and management of functions, the government does 
not make comparable investments.” (Ibid. at 19.)
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services accounted for 67 percent of DHS contracting 
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Dramatically in the Last Decade,” October 30, 2003, 
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charged with writing, negotiating, monitoring, and 
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See Federal Acquisition Institute, 102. Annual Report on 
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in 2006), available at www.fai.gov/pdfs/FAI%20
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Side, Demand Side, Upside, and Downside at 89-90, 93 
(John D. Donahue and Joseph S. Nye Jr. Eds., 2002).  
AAP found that “the federal government does not 107. 
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on it.” Acquisition Advisory Panel, note 95, at 361.
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given how the government’s contracting function is 
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created in part by the ‘gotcha’ approach of some in the 
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attrition.” GAO-07-45SP, “Highlights of a GAO Forum: 
Federal Acquisition Challenges and Opportunities in the 
21st Century,” October 2006, available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0745sp.pdf. Moreover, anecdotal evidence 
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government expertise in the face of rising private-
sector compensation. See, e.g., testimony of Secretary 
of Defense Robert M. Gates, Hearing of the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations: The President’s FY 2008 
Supplement Request for the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
September 26, 2007 (“My personal concern about some 
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Advisory Panel Public Meeting, June 14, 2006.
See, generally, 110. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
37.104(a); 48 C.F.R. 37.104(a): “The government 
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direct hire under competitive appointment or other 
procedures required by the civil service laws. Obtaining 
personal services by contract, rather than by direct 
hire, circumvents those laws unless Congress has 
specifically authorized acquisition of the services by 
contract.” See also FAR 37.104(b); 48 C.F.R. 37.104(b).
“Agencies shall not award personal services contracts 111. 
unless specifically authorized by statute...to do so.” 
FAR 37.104(b); 48 C.F.R. 37.104(b).
See, e.g., Duke Testimony, 112. supra note 26, at 8.
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Law 106-398, section 821).” FAR 37.102(a), 48 C.F.R. 
37.102. See also, “Seven Steps to Performance-Based 
Acquisition,” available at www.acqnet.gov/comp/
seven_steps/introduction.html; and OFPP, Guide to Best 
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October 1998 (rescinded), available at www.whitehouse.
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The challenge for the acquisition community is to 
recognize this extraordinary transfer of responsibilities 
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FAR prohibition on [personal services contracts] is 
not compelled by applicable statutes and case law.” 
Acquisition Advisory Panel, note 95, at 400-04. 
See Gansler Commission, 118. supra note 24, at 26. 
See, generally, Section 832 of the Homeland Security 119. 
Act, 6 U.S.C. 392, including authority to contract without 
regard to the pay limitation of 5 U.S.C. 3109. Also, 
the Transportation Security Administration retained 
separate authority to engage in personal services 
contracts that derives from the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s procurement flexibilities. Moreover, the 
U.S. Coast Guard is specifically authorized to award 
medical personal services contracts. 10 USC 1091.
See Daniel I. Gordon, “Organizational Conflicts of 120. 
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Contract Law Journal, 25, 26-28, 2005 (attributing 
the increasing frequency of organizational COIs to the 
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them for discretionary judgments, and the growth of 
umbrella contracts requiring contractors to market 
to government buying officials to generate profit).
See Duke Testimony, 121. supra note 26, at 7-12.
Minow, note 9, at 1020-22 (noting that military are 122. 
lured to work for private contractors who pay more, thus 
sapping the military’s talent, resources, and control).
It is not surprising that GAO “found cases in which 123. 
the [DHS] components lacked the capacity to 
oversee contractor performance due to limited 
expertise and workload demands.” GAO, “DHS: 
Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed,” note 
6, at 22-23 (acknowledging that “at DOD, we have 
found cases of insufficient numbers of trained 
contracting oversight personnel, and cases in which 
personnel were not provided enough time to complete 
surveillance tasks, in part due to limited staffing.”). 
Gansler Commission, note 24, at 9.124. 
Ibid. at 106.125. 
Reality makes for bad policy. “No rational contemporary 126. 
legislator would risk campaigning based upon promises 
to hire more government employees.” Steven L. Schooner, 
“Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder,” 
33, Public Contract Law Journal, 263, 277, 2004. 
See S. 680, 127. supra note 33, at Section 101.
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